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1. Introduction
In this paper we compare the effectiveness of posi-
tive and negative incentives in an inspection game.
This game is often used to represent strategic set-
tings characterized by an imperfect alignment of
interests between players (e.g., interactions between
employers and employees, tax authorities and taxpay-
ers, regulators and firms, law enforcement agencies
and citizens, etc.).1 Note that these settings typically
have a hierarchical structure: an authority wishes
to induce compliance from subordinates. A standard
approach to encourage compliance is to use explicit
contracts that specify automatic and fixed penalties
in response to observed noncompliance. For example,
labor contracts may specify penalties for employees
1 See Avenhaus et al. (2002) for a review of the theory and discus-
sion of applications of inspection games.
who are found to underperform or violate the com-
pany’s conduct policy. In addition to automatic incen-
tives, authorities may also use discretionary incentives
to align subordinates’ interests with their own. For
example, in the labor context, the nature and sever-
ity of the sanctions relating to underperformance may
vary from verbal and written warnings to dismissal,
and employers often have discretion over which dis-
ciplinary actions (if any) to take against employ-
ees. Moreover, in many settings authorities comple-
ment the use of sanctions for poor performance with
the use of automatic and/or discretionary rewards.
For example, again in the labor context, employers
may decide to introduce bonus schemes to reward
good performance. Such schemes can vary from those
where bonuses are part of the employee’s contractual
entitlement to those where bonuses are awarded on
a discretionary basis to motivate employees. Rewards
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can also be given in the form of perks, such as pub-
lic recognitions of contribution (e.g., employee of the
month awards), and other nonmonetary benefits.
We conduct an experiment to study the roles of
sanctions and rewards. Our experiment builds on
the standard inspection game discussed in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991). They discuss a one-shot interac-
tion between an employee who chooses whether to
work or shirk and an employer who simultaneously
chooses whether or not to inspect the employee.
Working is costly to the employee and generates rev-
enue for the employer. Inspections are costly to the
employer. The employee receives a wage from the
employer unless she is inspected and found shirk-
ing: in this case the employer automatically with-
holds her wage. This can be interpreted as a contract
where the employee is paid a flat wage conditional
on working. To enforce the contract, the employer
needs to provide verifiable evidence of shirking to the
court, and costly inspections are necessary for provid-
ing verifiable evidence. Joint payoffs are maximized
when the employee works and the employer does not
inspect, but in the unique mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium of the one-shot game inspections and shirking
occur with positive probability. Thus, automatic incen-
tives alone are not sufficient to eliminate shirking in
equilibrium.
Our focus is on a repeated version of this game,
and how the use of discretionary rewards and/or sanc-
tions, on top of the automatic sanctions embedded
in the inspection game, can discourage shirking. In
practice, the scope for using discretionary incentives
varies considerably across institutional settings, and
so we vary the scope across various treatments.
In a Baseline treatment, where discretionary incen-
tives are not available, we find substantial rates of
inspection and shirking: the proportion of inspections
is 70% and employees shirk about 46% of the time.
In our other treatments, we allow employers to sanc-
tion or reward employees after observing stage game
payoffs. Both sanctions and rewards are costly for
the employer, whereas sanctions reduce, and rewards
increase, the employees’ payoff.
In one set of treatments, we only allow the use
of sanctions or rewards after the employer has in-
spected. Thus, although payoffs reveal the employee’s
actions, the employer has discretion to reward work-
ers or punish shirkers only if an inspection has
been carried out to provide complementary evidence
about the employee’s action. For instance, a man-
ager who wants to punish a slacking employee may
be compelled to create a track record to justify the
intended punishment to a labor union. Similar forms
of limited discretion are commonplace in performance
evaluation schemes in many organizations where
performance appraisers are themselves agents in a
principal-agent relationship with a principal. Even
though the appraiser knows the appraisee has per-
formed well, some costly monitoring process has to be
used before the appraiser can award a discretionary
bonus. For example, this may be the case in firms
where managers who exercise reward or punishment
power over subordinates are themselves accountable
to superiors for their decisions.
In these limited discretion treatments, we find that
the availability of either sanctions or rewards reduces
the proportion of shirking relative to the baseline
treatment (to 29% in both cases). In the treatment with
sanctions this is achieved with a lower inspection rate
than in the treatment with rewards. An implication
of this is that sanctions or rewards increase combined
earnings by roughly the same amount, but the effi-
ciency gains accrue solely to the employer when sanc-
tions are available, whereas the efficiency gains are
shared in the case of discretionary rewards. We think
this is a direct consequence of the nature of the incen-
tive tools; rewards allow the employer to redistribute
part of the efficiency gains, whereas this is not possi-
ble with sanctions.
One feature of the limited discretion treatments is
that if the employer wants to reward the worker for
working, she needs to inspect and incur the associated
inspection costs. This makes a strategy of encourag-
ing work by rewarding workers less efficient, and so
our limited discretion treatment may underestimate
the efficacy of rewards. In another set of treatments,
we allow the employer to administer discretionary
rewards or punishments independently of whether
the employer inspected. This set of treatments is rel-
evant for situations where employers do not have to
justify their behavior to a principal, as may be the
case in owner-managed firms where managers do not
have to explain their use of discretionary rewards or
punishments to a superior.2
We find that extending the employer’s discretion
in this manner does not alter the effectiveness of
punishment, but increases the effectiveness of discre-
tionary rewards. When employers are free to use dis-
cretionary rewards without the need for inspections,
the rate of shirking drops to 15%. As a result, rewards
are more effective than punishment in the high dis-
cretion treatments. As in the limited discretion treat-
ments, the efficiency gains of punishments only ben-
efit the employer, whereas with rewards, the greater
increase in combined earnings is shared much more
equally.
To compare the effectiveness of discretionary re-
wards and sanctions, our experiment varies the avail-
ability of the instruments across treatments, and
2 We thank an associate editor for suggesting these additional
treatments.
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employers have available, at most, one of the instru-
ments. In natural workplaces both instruments are
often available to employers. Thus, we conducted
additional treatments where employers can combine
discretionary sanctions and rewards. In these treat-
ments we find that employers rely mainly on rewards,
and the results from these treatments are very similar
to the treatments where only rewards are available.
In summary, our findings suggest that both pos-
itive and negative discretionary incentives can be
effective in disciplining the behavior of subordinates
and increasing efficiency. However, the two instru-
ments work quite differently and their relative merits
depend on how freely they can be administered. From
an efficiency perspective, sanctions involve an obvi-
ous disadvantage relative to rewards, in that punish-
ment is costly to both the punisher and punishee. If
the threat of sanctions eliminates shirking, then pun-
ishment is not necessary and these deadweight costs
can be avoided, but if the threat works imperfectly,
the loss of efficiency is compounded by the costs of
having to use the instrument. In contrast, if rewards
successfully motivate subordinates, then they must be
actively used. In our setting, rewards increase com-
bined earnings, although if employers need to engage
in costly inspections in order to administer rewards,
then these costs undermine the efficacy of rewards.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In the next section we introduce the inspection games
used in our experiment and in §3 describe our design
and experimental procedures. We present our experi-
mental results in §§4 and 5. In §6 we discuss how our
findings relate to the literature in more detail, and we
conclude.
2. The Inspection Game
The inspection game involves two players and
simultaneous moves. The employer chooses between
“inspect” and “not inspect,” and the employee
chooses between “work” and “shirk.” In the stan-
dard version of the game, the employer incurs a
cost of h from inspecting. If the employee works,
the employee incurs a cost of c and the employer
receives revenue of v. If the employer does not
inspect, the employee always receives a wage of w.
If the employer inspects, the employee receives the
wage only if she works. The resulting payoffs are
shown in Figure 1(a). We assume that all variables are
positive and v > c, w > h, w> c. Note that joint pay-
offs are maximized when the employee works and
the employer does not inspect. In the unique Nash
equilibrium, the employer inspects with probability
p = c/w and the employee shirks with probability
q = h/w. The employer receives an expected payoff
of employer = v−w− hv/w, the employee receives an
Figure 1 Inspection Game
(A) STANDARD INSPECTION
GAME
(B) EXPERIMENTAL INSPECTION
GAME
Work Shirk Work Shirk
Inspect
V n W n H
W n C
W n C
n H

30
20
10
15
Not inspect
Inspect
Not inspect
V n W n W
W
45
20
5
35
Notes. Employer is ROW player, employee is COLUMN player. Within each
cell, the employer’s payoff is shown at the top and the employee’s payoff at
the bottom.
expected payoff of employee =w− c, and joint payoffs
are employer +employee = v− c−hv/w.
For the experiment, we set v = 40, w = 20, c = 15,
and h = 15 and added a constant of 15 to the
employee’s payoff and 25 to the employer’s payoff
to ensure that all earnings are positive. Figure 1(b)
presents the resulting payoffs that we used in the
experiment. With these parameters, the employer’s
equilibrium inspection probability is p = 3/4 and the
employee’s equilibrium shirking probability is q =
3/4, giving expected payoffs of 15 for the employer
and 20 for the employee. This inspection game is the
stage game in our baseline treatment.
In our treatments with low discretionary power,
if the employer has chosen “not inspect,” the stage
game ends. However, if the employer chose “inspect,”
the stage game continues. In the games where we
allow for punishments, the employer observes the
employee’s choice and then chooses between “no
action” and punish.” If he chooses “no action,” then
the payoffs are simply determined by the payoffs of
the inspection game. If he chooses “punish” he must
assign a punishment level k from the set {0, 1, 2, 3,
4, 5} and the employer’s payoff from the inspection
game is then decreased by k and the employee’s pay-
off is decreased by 3k. Thus, these discretionary pun-
ishments are costly for both parties and have a nega-
tive direct impact on combined earnings.3 Figure 2(a)
presents this augmented game graphically.
Similarly, in the games where we allow for rewards,
the employer can choose between “no action” and
“reward” after an inspection. If he chooses “reward,”
he then chooses the reward level l from the set
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the employer’s payoff from the
inspection game is then decreased by l while the
3 Except, of course, in the case where the employer assigns zero
punishment. We decided to include this in the set of available pun-
ishments because it may be useful for signaling purposes in set-
tings where the game is played repeatedly, e.g., an employer might
assign zero punishment tokens as a warning.
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Figure 2 Augmented Inspection Games
(B) Low Discretion Game with Rewards(A) Low Discretion Game with Punishments
Employer
Employer
Employee
30, 20 10, 15
45, 25 5, 35
30–k, 20–3k 10–k, 15–3k
No
action
No
actionPunish k Punish k
Work Shirk ShirkWork
Not inspect
Inspect
30, 20 10, 15
(45, 20) (5, 35)
30– l, 20+3l 10– l, 15+3l
Shirk Shirk
Not inspect
Employer
Employer
Employee
No
action
No
action
Work Work
Inspect
e
e
e
Reward l Reward l
(C) High Discretion Game with Punishments
45, 20 5, 3545–k, 20–3k 5–k, 35–3k30, 20 10, 1530–k, 20–3k 10–k, 15–3k
No
action
No
actionPunish k Punish k
No
actionPunish k Punish k
Shirk ShirkWork
Not inspect
Employer
Employer
Employee
No
action
Work
Inspect
e
(D) (igh Discretion Game with Rewards
Not inspect
Employer
Employer
Employee
No
action
Work
Inspect
30, 20 30– l, 20+3l
Shirk Shirk
No
action
No
actionReward l
10, 15 10– l, 15+3l 45, 20 45– l, 20+3l 5, 35 5– l, 35+3l
Work
Reward l
No
actionReward l Reward l
e
 
Notes. The first payoff accrues to the employer and the second payoff to employee. When choosing k(or l5, the employer is informed of whether the worker
worked or shirked, and therefore can choose a different k (or l5 after work than after shirk.
employee’s payoff is increased by 3l.4 Note that the
use of rewards can increase combined earnings; a
maximal reward costs the employer 5 points and ben-
efits the employee 15 points, giving a net benefit
of 10 points. Note, however, that rewards can only
be given following an inspection, and the inspection
cost (15 points) exceeds the net benefit from maximal
rewards. Thus, combined earnings are still maximized
when the employee works and the employer does not
inspect. The augmented game with reward possibili-
ties is shown in Figure 2(b).
In our high discretion treatments, the employer
can assign punishments or rewards independently of
whether he inspects. The extensive forms of the stage
game are shown in Figures 2(c) and 2(d).
Subgame perfect equilibria of the augmented games
can be identified by backward induction. A self-
ish and rational employer will never assign positive
4 We also conducted low discretion sessions where the impact/fee
ratio (i.e., the cost/benefit of the instrument to the employee rela-
tive to the cost of instrument to employer) was one to one. These
treatments did not result in significant differences from Baseline
in terms of either shirk rate, inspection rate, employer payoff, or
employee payoff. See Nosenzo et al. (2012) for details. Several
public good experiments also find that costly punishment/reward
is more effective with a higher impact/fee ratio (e.g., Ambrus and
Greiner 2012, Egas and Riedl 2008, Nikiforakis and Normann 2008).
rewards or punishments since it lowers her own pay-
off. This behavior is anticipated by the players, and,
as a result, play in the phase preceding the punish-
ment/reward phase remains unaffected. Thus, in the
subgame perfect equilibrium, players mix between
their actions in precisely the same way as in the base-
line treatment, i.e., p = 3/4 and q = 3/4, and discre-
tionary rewards or punishments are never used.
In naturally occurring workplace settings, and in
our experiment, employers and employees are usu-
ally engaged in a repeated interaction. Here, we con-
sider the case where in each stage the game described
above is played and where a player’s earnings are
simply the sum of his earnings over all stage games.
After each stage game, there will be a new stage game
with independent probability  and this process con-
tinues until it is terminated by chance. As is well
known, repetition of the stage game equilibrium con-
stitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the indefi-
nitely repeated game, but other outcomes can be sus-
tained as equilibria as well.
First, consider the Baseline game where punish-
ment and rewards are not possible. Repetition of the
joint payoff maximizing outcome cannot be sustained
in equilibrium. To see this, note that for any pair of
strategies yielding the outcome “not inspect, work” in
every stage, and hence a payoff of 20 for the employee
in every stage, the employee can deviate to a strategy
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
28
.24
3.2
.47
] o
n 1
2 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7, 
at 
07
:39
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Nosenzo et al.: Discretionary Sanctions and Rewards in the Repeated Inspection Game
506 Management Science 62(2), pp. 502–517, © 2016 INFORMS
that specifies shirking in the first stage and working
in all subsequent stages. This deviation is profitable
since it yields 35 in the first stage and 20 in all subse-
quent stages.
However, even if the joint-payoff maximizing out-
come cannot be fully achieved it can be approximated
rather closely by subgame perfect equilibrium strate-
gies. Consider the following strategies: On the equi-
librium path, the employer does not inspect and the
worker shirks every nth stage. If the worker shirks in
any other stage, or if the employer ever inspects, both
players revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium in all
stages thereafter. These strategies generate a cycle of
outcomes where “not inspect, work” occurs except for
every nth stage when “not inspect, shirk” occurs. The
expected sum of payoffs from the beginning of the
cycle is V employercycle = 45/41 − 5− n−140/41 − n5 for the
employer and V employeecycle = 20/41 − 5+ n−115/41 − n5
for the employee. Letting V employerNash = 15/41 − 5 and
V
employee
Nash = 20/41 − 5 be the expected sums of payoffs
from one-shot Nash equilibrium play, the cycle strate-
gies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if
V
employee
cycle ≥ 35 + V employeeNash and
5 + V employercycle ≥ 10 + V employerNash 0
The first inequality ensures that the employee has no
incentive to deviate at the beginning of the cycle (as
he approaches the end of the cycle any incentive to
deviate only diminishes). The second ensures that the
employer has no incentive to deviate at the end of
the cycle. As  increases, these constraints can be met
with larger n, and the relative frequency of attaining
the efficient stage game outcome approaches one.
Similarly, when employers can only reward follow-
ing an inspection, the indefinitely repeated game does
not have a fully efficient subgame perfect equilibrium,
but there are analogous subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies that cycle between “not inspect, work” and
“inspect, work” and improve on the one-shot equilib-
rium for both players. As  increases the relative fre-
quency of attaining the efficient stage game outcome
approaches one.
For our other treatments, the efficient outcome can
be supported by subgame perfect equilibrium strate-
gies. When employers can reward independently of
whether they inspect, the efficient outcome is “not
inspect, work” followed by maximal rewards, giving
the employer a stage payoff of 40 and the employee
a stage payoff of 35. This outcome can be supported
by simple Nash reversion strategies. The employee
never has an incentive to deviate from working, the
employer never has an incentive to inspect, and as
long as 40/41 − 5≥ 45 + 15/41 − 5, or, equivalently,
 ≥ 1/6, the employer has no incentive to withhold
the reward. When employers can punish (either fol-
lowing an inspection, or independently of whether
they inspect) it is possible to attain repetition of
the efficient outcome “not inspect, work” in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium, because punishment allows
the employer to reduce the employee’s stage pay-
off below 20, and this can then serve as a threat
that induces the employee to work. If the employee
shirks in a stage, a disciplinary phase will start in
which the employer persistently chooses to inspect
and to assign punishment points. In this phase, the
employee’s stage game payoff is reduced below 20
and if the discount factor is sufficiently high, the
employee will prefer to work if she faces this threat.5
On the equilibrium path the outcome “not inspect,
work” is observed in every stage, punishment is not
actually used, and all of the efficiency gains relative
to the one-shot equilibrium accrue to the employer.
3. Experimental Design and
Procedures
The computerized experiments were carried out at the
University of Nottingham with 178 subjects recruited
from a campus-wide distribution list.6 No subject
participated in more than one session. Three ses-
sions were conducted for each of five treatments,
with either five or six pairs of participants in a ses-
sion. Sessions consisted of a number of rounds, and
at the end of a session subjects were paid in cash
according to their accumulated point earnings from
all rounds. Sessions took about 40 minutes on aver-
age and earnings ranged between £5.65 and £23.20,
averaging £13.21.
At the beginning of a session subjects were ran-
domly assigned to computer terminals and given
paper copies of instructions, which an experimenter
then read out loud. The instructions concluded with
a series of questions testing subjects’ understanding
of the instructions. Answers were checked by the
experimenters, who dealt privately with any remain-
ing questions. During a session, no communication
between subjects was allowed.
After the instructional phase, subjects were as-
signed to pairs and roles. Within each pair, one sub-
ject received the role of employer and the other the
role of employee.7 Subjects knew that they would stay
in the same role and in the same pair during the
5 For details, see Nosenzo et al. (2012).
6 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system
ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The instructions to subjects that were
used in the experiment are reproduced in Online Appendix A
(available as supplemental material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2014.2124).
7 The actual labels used in the experiment were “employer” and
“worker.”
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whole experiment. They were informed that the ses-
sion consisted of at least 70 rounds. From round 70
onward, each round could be the last one with prob-
ability 1/5.8
In each treatment, at the beginning of a round,
the employee chose between “high effort” (work)
and “low effort” (shirk) and, at the same time, the
employer chose between “inspect” and “not inspect.”
Choices led to point earnings as presented in the right
panel of Figure 1. In the Baseline treatment these were
the only choices made in the round, and subjects were
immediately informed about the choices and point
earnings within their pair.
The other treatments varied from the Baseline treat-
ment in the instruments available to employers for
incentivizing employees (punishments or rewards),
and the level of discretion available to employers in
using the incentives (low or high). In these treat-
ments, after being informed of whether the employee
chose work or shirk, the employer had to make an
additional choice. In the low discretion treatments,
this additional choice was available to the employer
only if he had first committed to an inspection. In
the high discretion treatments, the additional choice
was available to the employer regardless of his choice
whether or not to inspect. In the PLow_Discretion and
PHigh_Discretion treatments, the employer chose between
“no action” and “punish,” and if “punish” was cho-
sen, the employer then chose the number of punish-
ment tokens, between zero and five, to assign to the
employee. Each token cost the employer one point
and reduced the employee’s earnings by three points.
In the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treatments, the
employer chose between “no action” and “reward,”
and if “reward” was chosen, he then had to choose the
number of reward tokens, between zero and five, to
assign to the employee. Each token cost the employer
one point and increased the employee’s earnings by
three points. Finally, both players were informed of
all choices and earnings in the pair (so the employee
was also informed in case the employer assigned zero
reward/punishment tokens). Table 1 summarizes the
experimental design.
4. Results
4.1. The Impact of Incentives on
Inspecting and Shirking
Figure 3 displays the proportion of inspecting (top
panels) and shirking (bottom panels) across rounds
disaggregated by treatment. Table 2 reports aver-
age rates of inspecting and shirking across the first
8 In fact, the last round was randomly determined according to
these rules prior to the Baseline sessions, and this resulted in three
sessions with 71, 73, and 83 rounds, respectively. We then used
these durations for the other treatments as well.
Table 1 Experimental Design
Level of Number of
Treatment Punishments Rewards discretion pairs
Baseline No No — 17
PLow_Discretion Yes No Low 18
PHigh_Discretion Yes No High 18
RLow_Discretion No Yes Low 18
RHigh_Discretion No Yes High 18
70 rounds of the experiment as well as significance
levels of treatment comparisons based on two-tailed
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.9
First, consider the low discretion treatments.
The rate of inspection is similar in Baseline and
RLow_Discretion. As shown in Figure 3 (top left panel)
in both treatments, inspections increase across rounds
and stabilize at the Nash stage game equilibrium
level (75%) in the last third of the experiment.
The rate of inspection is somewhat lower in the
PLow_Discretion treatment, although only the difference
between PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion is statistically
significant at the 5% level (see Table 2).
The rate of shirking in the low discretion treat-
ments is shown in the bottom-left panel of Figure 3.
In all treatments this is quite stable across rounds
and much lower than the Nash stage game equi-
librium level (75%). There is noticeably less shirk-
ing in PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion than in Baseline,
and these differences are statistically significant. It
is worth noting that the rate of shirking is not sig-
nificantly different in PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion,
and so the lower inspection frequency in the pun-
ishment treatment relative to the reward treatment is
not associated with higher shirking. Thus, under low
discretion, both incentive tools are equally effective
in reducing shirking, but inspection rates are lower
when punishment is available.
The right panels of Figure 3 contain data from
the Baseline and high discretion treatments. Simi-
lar to the low discretion case, the rate of inspection
in PHigh_Discretion is somewhat lower than in Baseline,
but the difference is not statistically significant. The
inspection rate in the RHigh_Discretion treatment is signif-
icantly lower than in Baseline and PHigh_Discretion. Thus,
9 In all tests we consider data from each pair as one independent
observation and so the tests are applied to 18 independent obser-
vations per treatment (17 in Baseline). Tests are applied to averages
based on the first 70 rounds of the experiment, where we have data
from all 89 pairs who took part in the experiment. Analysis using
all data is complicated by the fact that some pairs interacted for
more rounds than others and we have very small sample sizes in
the later rounds. However, all our main results also hold in the full
sample. To check whether there is any evidence of learning in our
data, we repeated the analysis using only observations from the
second half of the experiment. All our main results are unchanged;
details are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 3 Proportion of Inspections (Top Panels) and Shirking (Bottom Panels) Across Rounds
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Note. The figure is based on data from 18 games per treatment (17 in Baseline).
and in contrast to the low discretion case, inspections
are used much less frequently when rewards can be
administered independently of the commitment to an
inspection. In fact, the difference in inspection rates
between the R treatments with low and high discre-
tion is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the
contrary, in the case of punishment, the higher discre-
tion in the use of the instrument does not significantly
affect the frequency with which employers commit to
inspections.
The lower inspection rate in the RHigh_Discretion treat-
ment is not associated with a higher rate of shirk-
ing. In fact, the level of shirking in RHigh_Discretion is
noticeably lower than in Baseline and PHigh_Discretion,
and these differences are highly significant. The rate
of shirking is also significantly lower in PHigh_Discretion
than Baseline. Thus, the higher discretion available to
employers in the use of rewards increases the effec-
tiveness of the instrument: the rate of shirking in the
RHigh_Discretion treatment is significantly lower than in
RLow_Discretion. In contrast, the effectiveness of punish-
ment in deterring shirking is not affected by level of
discretion available to the employer.
In summary, although theoretically the efficient out-
come can be approximated even in the standard
inspection game, our experiments reveal consider-
able efficiency losses in the absence of discretionary
incentives. The availability of discretionary punish-
ment and rewards considerably improves efficiency,
although the relative effectiveness of the instru-
ments depends on the level of discretion available
to employers. When employers can only administer
incentives after an inspection (low discretion case),
punishments and rewards are equally effective in dis-
couraging shirking relative to the standard inspection
game. However, the punishment tool has the advan-
tage that the reduction in shirking is achieved with
less costly inspections than when rewards are avail-
able. Thus, the effectiveness of punishment seems to
mainly operate through the threat rather than the use
of sanctions. In contrast, the effectiveness of rewards
relies on the active use of the instruments, which,
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Table 2 Average Inspection and Shirking Rates
Baseline PLow_Discretion RLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RHigh_ Discretion
(n = 17) (n = 18) (n = 18) (n = 18) (n = 18)
Inspect (%) 70 56 76 55 32
Shirk (%) 46 29 29 29 15
Baseline PLow_Discretion RLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RHigh_Discretion
Baseline — — — — —
PLow_Discretion n.s./∗∗ — — — —
RLow_Discretion n.s./∗∗ ∗∗/n.s. — — —
PHigh_Discretion n.s./∗∗ n.s./n.s. — — —
RHigh_Discretion
∗∗∗/∗∗∗ — ∗∗∗/∗∗ ∗∗/∗∗∗ —
Notes. The first two rows of the table contain the average rates of inspecting
and shirking across the first 70 rounds of the experiment. The remaining
rows of the table contain significance levels of pair-wise two-tailed Wilcoxon
rank-sum tests. In each cell the first entry refers to tests applied to inspection
rates, and the second entry refers to tests applied to shirking rates.
∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001 (n.s., not significant).
in the low discretion treatments, involves inefficient
inspections on the part of the employer. In the high
discretion treatments, however, employers can use the
instruments independently of whether they inspect.
Although this does not change the effectiveness of
punishment relative to the low discretion case, it
has a dramatic impact in the reward treatment. Here
we observe substantially less shirking and inspect-
ing than in the low discretion case. Thus, rewards
can be more effective than sanctions, if employers do
not have to engage in costly inspections to use the
incentives.
4.2. The Use and Effectiveness of
Punishments and Rewards
We next focus on the treatments with discretionary
punishments or rewards, and examine how employ-
ers used the incentives and how employees reacted
to this. In the experiment, after learning the choice
of the employee, employers decided whether to take
no action or to assign punishment or reward tokens,
depending on the treatment (in the low discretion
treatments, these choices were available only after
an inspection). Figure 4 shows the proportion of “no
action” decisions and punishment/rewards tokens
assignments disaggregated by treatment. In the exper-
iment, punishments are mainly targeted at shirkers
and rewards are mainly given to employees observed
to have worked in that round. Thus, we observe
very little use of punishment against employees who
worked—this occurs in 36 out of 1,382 games—and
very little use of rewards for shirkers, in 48 out of
480 games. Therefore, in Figure 4 we report punish-
ment decisions for the cases where the employee was
observed to shirk for the PLow_Discretion and PHigh_Discretion
treatments, whereas we report reward decisions for
the cases where the employee was observed to work
for the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treatments. In
the high discretion treatments (right panels), we dis-
aggregate the data depending on whether or not the
punishment/rewards tokens were assigned after an
inspection. In the low discretion treatments (left pan-
els), token assignments were only possible after an
inspection.
In the PLow_Discretion (top-left) and PHigh_Discretion (top-
right) treatments, punishment happens more often
than not when an employee is caught shirking after
an inspection (62% of the games in PLow_Discretion and
71% in PHigh_Discretion5. However, when the employer
does not inspect in PHigh_Discretion, shirkers are only
punished 37% of the times. When employers decide
to punish, in both treatments by far the most com-
mon use of the incentive tool is to assign maximal
punishment to the employee (five tokens). Overall,
the expected number of punishment tokens assigned
to an employee who shirks is equal to 2.10 in
PLow_Discretion, 3.10 in PHigh_Discretion when the employer
inspects, and 1.70 in PHigh_Discretion when the employer
does not inspect.
In the RLow_Discretion treatment (bottom-left) employ-
ers reward employees found working in 71% of the
games, and in the RHigh_Discretion treatment (bottom-
right) in 67% of the games where the employer
inspects and 95% of the games where the employer
does not inspect. Rewards are used differently under
low and high discretion. In RLow_Discretion, following
an inspection, employers tend to use either maxi-
mal rewards (21% of the time), or to assign two or
three reward tokens (respectively, 17% and 20% of
the time). In RHigh_Discretion, maximal rewards are used
only 4% of the times after an inspection, and the
most frequent assignments are one or two reward
tokens (respectively, 27% and 32% of the time). More-
over, the pattern of rewards is different when employ-
ers do not inspect: here rewards are mostly used to
reward employees maximally (this occurs in 72% of
the games). As a consequence, the expected number
of reward tokens assigned to an employee who works
varies from 2.18 in RLow_Discretion, to 1.26 in RHigh_Discretion
when the employer inspects, to 4.33 RHigh_Discretion
when the employer does not inspect. This change
in the way rewards are used may reflect employers’
concerns with relative earnings. For example, differ-
ences in earnings between the players are minimized
by assigning two or three reward tokens following
“inspect, work” and by assigning five reward tokens
following “not inspect, work.”
Table 3 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regres-
sions of the use of the punishment/reward instruments
across the four treatments. In all regression models, the
dependent variable is the number of punishment or
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Figure 4 Use of Punishments for Shirk and Rewards for Work
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Note. Based on 223 games in PLow_Discretion, 365 games in PHigh_Discretion, 660 games in RLow_Discretion, and 1,074 games in RHigh_Discretion.
rewards tokens assigned to an employee.10 We regress
this on a constant and on a dummy variable assum-
ing value 1 if the employee is observed to shirk in
that round. For the high discretion treatments, we also
include a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the
employer inspects in that round. We also control for
period and learning effects by including a “round”
variable in all models. To account for the panel struc-
ture of the data, we add individual-level fixed effects
to all regression models.
The regressions confirm that punishments are
mainly used to sanction shirkers, and rewards are
mainly given to employees who are observed to work.
Both under low and high discretion, employers assign
significantly more punishment tokens and signifi-
cantly fewer reward tokens to employees who have
shirked in that round. The regressions also show some
differences in the use of punishment and rewards
across rounds. Employees are punished less in later
rounds of the experiment, although the effect is only
significant in the low discretion treatment. The use of
rewards is instead more stable over time. Finally, the
regressions confirm that in the high discretion treat-
ments the use of the instruments varies depending on
whether or not employers commit to an inspection.
Employees are punished somewhat more strongly
10 In the regressions, the dependent variable assumes value 0 also
when the employer chooses “no action.”
after an inspection, although the difference is not sta-
tistically significant, whereas they receive significantly
less rewards when the employer inspects.
We next examine the effectiveness of the punish-
ment and reward instruments by studying employ-
ees’ probability of shirking in the round following
the assignment of a punishment or reward. Table 4
shows, across treatments, the proportion of employ-
ees who shirk in round t following a “no action,”
“punish,” or “reward” decision by the employer in
round t − 1. As before, for the PLow_Discretion and
Table 3 Use of Punishments and Rewards
PLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RLow_Discretion RHigh_Discretion
1 if shirk 10294∗∗∗ 20423∗∗∗ −00906∗∗∗ −10629∗∗∗
4003435 4004385 4002205 4004235
1 if inspect — 00088 — −00841∗∗∗
4002395 4002235
Round −00004∗∗ −00005 00001 00002
4000025 4000035 4000035 4000045
Constant 00193 00101 10453∗∗∗ 30409∗∗∗
4001245 4002215 4001215 4001305
No. of observations 1,260 1,260 1,260 1,260
No. of groups 18 18 18 18
R2 00169 00403 00141 00573
Notes. Fixed-effects OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Depen-
dent variable is number of punishment/reward tokens assigned. When the
employer chooses “no action,” the dependent variable takes value 0. Robust
standard errors reported in parentheses.
∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
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Table 4 Probability of Shirking in Round t After Punishments/Rewards in Round t − 1
Punishment/reward in round t − 1
Employer/employee
Treatment actions in round t − 1 No action or zero tokens One or two tokens Three or four tokens Five tokens
PLow_Discretion Inspect, shirk 50% 50% 62% 48%
(n = 102) (n = 28) (n = 21) (n = 69)
PHigh_Discretion Inspect, shirk 49% 25% 44% 52%
(n = 47) (n = 12) (n = 16) (n = 84)
Not inspect, shirk 38% 33% 25% 29%
(n = 123) (n = 6) (n = 8) (n = 62)
RLow_Discretion Inspect, work 27% 18% 7% 15%
(n = 192) (n = 179) (n = 146) (n = 136)
RHigh_Discretion Inspect, work 35% 14% 0% 0%
(n = 93) (n = 170) (n = 12) (n = 13)
Not inspect, work 32% 17% 15% 2%
(n = 40) (n = 53) (n = 120) (n = 559)
Notes. Proportion of employees who shirk in round t in response to a given punishment/reward assignment in round t − 1. Number of games reported in
parentheses.
PHigh_Discretion treatments we restrict attention to cases
where the employee was observed to shirk in round
t − 1, and for the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treat-
ments to cases where the employee was observed
to work. For the high discretion treatments, we fur-
ther disaggregate the data depending on whether the
employer made an inspection in round t− 1.
Table 4 suggests that the use of punishments has
limited effectiveness in discouraging shirking. If the
employer takes no action or assigns zero punishment
tokens to an employee who is observed to shirk in
round t − 1, the probability that the employee will
shirk again in round t is between 38% and 50%
depending on treatment. This probability of shirking
is hardly reduced by the use of punishments: if the
employer assigns maximal punishment (five tokens)
to a shirker, the probability that the employee will
shirk again in round t varies between 29% and 52%
across treatments. In fact, in some cases, the use of
punishment seems to increase the probability of shirk-
ing (e.g., in PLow_Discretion and in PHigh_Discretion after an
inspection). The use of rewards has instead a stronger
dissuasive effect on shirking. Withholding a reward
from an employee who is observed to work in round
t− 1, increases the probability that the employee will
shirk in round t to between 27% and 35% depend-
ing on treatment. However, the probability of shirk-
ing falls between 0% and 15% when the employer
rewards maximally an employee who is observed to
work. The dissuasive effect of rewards appears par-
ticularly strong in RHigh_Discretion, where the probability
of shirking is virtually reduced to zero with the use
of maximal rewards.
In Table 5, we examine these patterns more for-
mally by conducting a regression analysis of employ-
ees’ responses in round t to punishments/rewards
assigned by the employer in round t − 1. We run a
separate regression model for each of our four treat-
ments. In all models, the dependent variable assumes
value 1 if the employee shirks in round t, and 0 other-
wise. We regress this on a set of dummy variables for
the possible game outcomes in round t − 1 (“inspect,
shirk”; “inspect, work”; “not inspect, shirk”—note
that the efficient outcome “not inspect, work” is used
as baseline category). We measure the impact of pun-
ishment and reward on shirking across the four possi-
ble outcomes of the game by interacting the outcome
variables with the number of punishment/reward
tokens assigned to the employee in round t − 1.11 All
models also include a constant and a “round” variable
to control for period and learning effects. We estimate
linear probability models with individual-level fixed
effects to account for the panel structure of the data.
The regressions for the punishment treatments con-
firm the limited effectiveness of sanctions in discour-
aging shirking. In neither punishment treatment does
punishing a shirker reduce the employee’s propensity
to shirk in the next round, and, in fact, in PLow_Discretion
there is a marginally significant positive effect. More-
over, in both punishment treatments, punishing an
employee who works significantly increases the prob-
ability that the employee shirks in the next round.
This seems a reasonable response to a perverse use
of the punishment instrument, although these cases
are quite rare in the data.12 Rewards are instead
11 When the employer chooses “no action,” we assign value 0 to
these variables. In the low discretion models only, interactions with
game outcomes where the employer inspects are included in the
regressions.
12 This perverse effect of punishment echoes the findings on the
reduced effectiveness of sanctions when these are perceived as
unkind or hostile by the recipient of the punishment (e.g., Fehr
and Gächter 2002, Fehr and Rockenbach 2003, Fehr and List 2004,
Dickinson and Villeval 2008, Houser et al. 2008, Fuster and Meier
2010, Nikiforakis et al. 2012).
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Table 5 Effectiveness of Punishments and Rewards
PLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RLow_Discretion RHigh_Discretion
“Inspect, shirk” in t − 1 −00078 00126 00084 00060
4000565 4001315 4000715 4001065
“Inspect, work” in t − 1 −00219∗∗∗ −00097 −00210∗∗∗ −00029
4000515 4000615 4000555 4000835
“Not inspect, shirk” in t − 1 −00152∗∗ −00082 −00026 −00067
4000675 4000935 4000665 4001255
Tokens × “Inspect, shirk” in t − 1 00038∗ 00008 −00007 −00211∗∗∗
4000205 4000195 4000435 4000505
Tokens × ‘Insp, work” in t − 1 00032∗∗ 00053∗∗ 00021 −00064∗∗
4000125 4000225 4000145 4000295
Tokens × “Not inspect, shirk” in t − 1 — 00002 — −00041
4000165 4000335
Tokens × “Not inspect, work” in t − 1 — 00106∗∗∗ — −00031∗∗
4000135 4000155
Round −00001 −00000 −00001 −00001
4000015 4000015 4000015 4000015
Constant 00438∗∗∗ 00339∗∗∗ 00408∗∗∗ 00292∗∗∗
4000535 4000765 4000445 4000725
No. of observations 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242
No. of groups 18 18 18 18
R2 00024 00049 00079 00157
Notes. Fixed-effects OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable assumes value 1 if the employee shirks in round t , and 0 otherwise.
When the employer chooses “no action,” the “tokens” variables take value 0. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001.
more effective in discouraging shirking. This is par-
ticularly evident in the RHigh_Discretion treatment, where
all four interaction terms between game outcomes
and number of assigned tokens enter the regression
with a negative sign, and in three cases the coeffi-
cients are significantly different from zero at the 1%
or 5% level. The effect is less clear in the RLow_Discretion
treatment, where the two interaction terms between
reward tokens and game outcomes enter with a pos-
itive and negative coefficient, respectively. In both
cases, however, the coefficients are not significantly
different from zero.13
In summary, our analysis shows that employers
mainly target punishments at shirkers and target
rewards at employees who are observed to work.
The instruments, however, appear to have a differ-
ent impact on employees’ behavior. The use of pun-
ishment seems to have a limited effect on shirking:
the probability that employees shirk in a given round
of the experiment is hardly affected by whether or
not the employer has meted out punishments toward
them in the previous round. On the other hand, the
13 We also conducted analogous regressions to examine the deter-
minants of employers’ propensity to inspect. The regressions show
no clear relation between use of punishments and the propensity
to inspect, but do show that the use of rewards in a given round
reduces the probability that the employer inspects in the next round
(for both low and high discretion treatments). Details are available
from the authors on request.
use of rewards seems to reduce shirking. Employees
who work and receive a reward are very likely to con-
tinue working in subsequent periods, whereas they
are more likely to shirk if the employer withholds the
reward from them. These patterns are consistent with
our earlier observation that the effectiveness of sanc-
tions mainly relies on the threat of punishment rather
than the active use of the instrument, whereas the
effectiveness of rewards stems from their active use.
4.3. Efficiency and Earnings
We conclude our analysis by examining the impact of
punishments and rewards on players’ earnings and
efficiency. We focus on total earnings, i.e., the earnings
that players received at the end of each round, includ-
ing any cost or benefit following the use of rewards
and punishments. Since the maximum possible earn-
ings in RHigh_Discretion are higher than in the other treat-
ments, as a measure of efficiency, we take the percent-
age of maximum possible earnings extracted by the
players. Table 6 reports players’ individual earnings,
combined earnings, and efficiencies per game across
treatments.
In Baseline, combined earnings can range from
25 points (when the employer inspects and the
employee shirks) to 65 points (when the employer
does not inspect and the employee works). In the
Nash stage game equilibrium, predicted combined
earnings are 35 points (i.e., an efficiency of 54%). In
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Table 6 Individual Earnings and Efficiency
Baseline (n = 17) PLow_Discretion (n = 18) RLow_Discretion (n = 18) PHigh_Discretion (n = 18) RHigh_Discretion (n = 18)
Employer’s earnings 22082 27097 25030 27008 33003
[53%] [59%] [52%] [58%] [53%]
47 066 5 46 093 5 44022 5 44025 5 47 000 5
Employee’s earnings 20009 19054 23037 19074 29048
[47%] [41%] [48%] [42%] [47%]
42 042 5 42 006 5 43 049 5 43 015 5 45 069 5
Combined earnings 42091 47051 48067 46082 62051
48 0645 47 069 5 47 020 5 45 053 5 412 033 5
Efficiency 66% 73% 75% 72% 83%
Baseline PLow_Discretion RLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RHigh_Discretion
Baseline — — — — —
PLow_Discretion
∗/∗∗/n.s. — — — —
RLow_Discretion
∗∗/∗/∗∗∗ n.s./n.s./∗∗∗ — — —
PHigh_Discretion
∗/∗∗/n.s. n.s./n.s./n.s. — — —
RHigh_Discretion
∗∗∗/∗∗∗/∗∗∗ — ∗∗∗/ ∗∗∗/∗∗∗ ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ —
Notes. “Combined earnings” are the sum of employer and employee earnings. “Efficiency” is combined earnings as a percentage of maximum possible earnings.
(In all treatments maximum possible earnings are 65, except RHigh_Discretion where maximum possible earnings are 75.) Percentage of combined earnings accrued
to the employer and the employee in square brackets. Standard deviations based on group averages in parentheses. The lower part of the table reports
significance levels of pair-wise two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. In each cell the first entry refers to tests applied to combined earnings, the second entry
to tests applied to employers’ earnings, and the third entry to tests applied to employees’ earnings.
∗p < 0010; ∗∗p < 0005; ∗∗∗p < 0001 (n.s., not significant).
the experiment, efficiency is 12% higher than this,
and combined earnings average 42.91 points across
rounds. Averaged over all pairs, the main recipient of
this efficiency gain is the employer, who earns much
more than predicted (22.82 versus 15 points), whereas
employees’ earnings are close to the predicted level
(20.09 versus 20 points).
In the low discretion treatments, the availabil-
ity of punishment and rewards has a positive and
significant impact on efficiency and earnings. Rela-
tive to Baseline, combined earnings are significantly
higher in both PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion and effi-
ciency increases to 73% in PLow_Discretion and 75% in
RLow_Discretion. Although efficiency is slightly higher in
RLow_Discretion than PLow_Discretion, the difference in com-
bined earnings is not statistically significant.14 Rela-
tive to Baseline, employers’ earnings are significantly
higher in PLow_Discretion, whereas employees’ earnings
are lower, although this difference is not statistically
significant. Thus, the ability to punish is mostly ben-
eficial to employers, who on average reap about 59%
of combined earnings. In contrast, the efficiency gains
14 Of course, each time a reward token is assigned in RLow_Discretion
combined earnings increase by two points so it is perhaps not
surprising that combined earnings and efficiency are higher in
RLow_Discretion (however, note that given our parameterization of the
game in all treatments, combined earnings are maximized when
the employee works and the employer does not inspect). We also
calculated combined earnings net of the costs and benefits of
reward/punishment tokens. In this case combined earnings are
still significantly higher in the incentive treatments than Baseline,
and the difference between combined earnings in RLow_Discretion and
PLow_Discretion is still insignificant.
from rewards are shared by employers and employees
(52% of combined earnings accrue to employers and
48% to employees). Relative to Baseline, both employ-
ers’ and employees’ earnings increase significantly in
RLow_Discretion.
Analogous patterns emerge in the high discretion
treatments. Relative to Baseline, combined earnings
are significantly higher both in PHigh_Discretion and espe-
cially in RHigh_Discretion. This corresponds to efficien-
cies of 72% and 83%, respectively. The difference
in efficiency between high discretion punishments
and rewards is statistically significant.15 Employers’
earnings are significantly higher in PHigh_Discretion than
in Baseline. Employees are slightly worse off in
PHigh_Discretion, but the effect is again not significant.
Thus, the availability of punishments is mostly ben-
eficial to employers, who reap about 58% of com-
bined earnings. In contrast, the availability of rewards
allows a more equitable distribution of earnings
across players (with employers obtaining 53% and
employees 47% of combined earnings). Both employ-
ers’ and employees’ earnings increase significantly in
RHigh_Discretion relative to Baseline.
In summary, both rewards and punishments signif-
icantly enhance efficiency. The effects of both instru-
ments are similar in magnitude for the low discre-
tion case, whereas rewards are more efficient than
punishments under high discretion. Under both low
and high discretion, the main recipient of efficiency
15 We obtain the same results if we focus on combined earnings net
of the costs and benefits of reward/punishment tokens.
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gains is the employer when punishments are avail-
able, whereas efficiency gains are shared more equi-
tably when rewards are available.
5. A Further Treatment: Combining
Rewards and Punishments
The previous results raise an obvious question as
to what would follow from the availability of both
rewards and punishment, since both instruments are
available to employers in many naturally occurring
settings. In this section we report two additional treat-
ments that examine this question. In these treatments
employers could follow up an inspection with “no
action,” “punish,” or “reward,” and, if “punish” or
“reward” were chosen the employer could assign
punishment or reward tokens. We ran a treatment
with low discretion (R&PLow_Discretion5 and a treatment
with high discretion (R&PHigh_Discretion5. Apart from the
expanded set of options available to employers, the
sessions were conducted in the same way as those
of the initial study. In all, we recruited 72 subjects
and ran three sessions of each treatment with 12 sub-
jects per session. These sessions took about 40 min-
utes on average and earnings ranged between £7.10
and £23.30, averaging £14.89.
As in the previous treatments, the availability of
low discretion incentives reduces shirking: the rate of
shirking in R&PLow_Discretion (31%) is similar to those
in RLow_Discretion and PLow_Discretion (29%), and is signif-
icantly lower than in Baseline (31% versus 46%, p =
00049). An important result from our previous low
discretion treatments is that the reduction of shirk-
ing is achieved with a lower inspection rate when the
punishment tool is available than when rewards are
available. When both punishments and rewards are
simultaneously available, the frequency of inspections
is 66%, higher than when only punishments are avail-
able (PLow_Discretion, 56%), but lower than when only
rewards are available (RLow_Discretion, 76%). These dif-
ferences in inspection rates between R&PLow_Discretion
and the other treatments are not statistically signifi-
cant (p≥ 00199).
The effectiveness of the instruments increases under
high discretion. Shirking in the R&PHigh_Discretion treat-
ment is reduced to 11%, similar to the rate in
RHigh_Discretion (15%, p = 00506), and much lower than
those in Baseline (46%, p = 00000), PHigh_Discretion (29%,
p = 00000), and R&PLow_Discretion (31%, p = 00002). The
inspection rate in R&PHigh_Discretion is 20%, also simi-
lar to that in RHigh_Discretion (32%, p = 00335) and much
lower than in any of the other treatments (56% or
higher, p < 00001 in all comparisons).
We emphasize three main findings from the R&P
treatments. First, employers use the reward instru-
ment more often than the punishment instrument
in the R&P treatments. In R&PLow_Discretion, employ-
ers use rewards following an inspection in 49% of
games, whereas they punish in 20% of games. In
R&PHigh_Discretion, rewards are used in 71% of games,
and punishments are only used in 5% of games.16
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, as we have
seen earlier, the outcomes in the R&P are more similar
to those in the R than the P treatments.17
Second, employees are not disciplined more effec-
tively when employers can combine punishments
and rewards, compared to the case where only
rewards are available. In fact, although the simulta-
neous availability of punishments and rewards leads
to higher combined earnings both in R&PLow_Discretion
(47.15 points) and in R&PHigh_Discretion (64.68 points)
compared to Baseline (42.91 points, p = 00069 and
p = 00000, respectively), combined earnings in these
two treatments are not significantly different from
RLow_Discretion (48.67, p= 00429) or RHigher_Discretion (62.51,
p= 00589).18
Finally, the efficiency gains from combining pun-
ishment and reward instruments are shared by
the employer and employee. Compared to Baseline,
where employees earn on average 20.09 points per
game, employees’ earnings increase by about 10%
in R&PLow_Discretion (to 22.12 points, p = 00021) and by
about 45% in R&PHigh_Discretion (to 29.20 points, p =
00000). Similarly, employers’ earnings increase from
22.82 in Baseline by about 10% in R&PLow_Discretion
(albeit insignificantly so; 25.03 points, p = 00121), and
by about 55% in R&PHigh_Discretion (to 35.47 points, p =
00000). This is different from the P treatments where
efficiency gains accrue only to the employer, and more
closely resembles the pattern in the R treatments.
16 The use and effectiveness of punishment and rewards in the
R&P treatments is similar to that in the other incentive treatments.
Rewards are mainly assigned to employees who are found work-
ing and punishments to employees caught shirking. The active use
of punishment is not a very effective way to discourage shirk-
ing, whereas the reward instrument is more effective. Details are
reported in Online Appendix B.
17 An interesting question is whether there are differences in the
use of the two instruments by each employer, and whether these
differences are stable across rounds. In the experiment, we see that
most employers predominantly use rewards. With low discretion,
12 employers reward more often than they punish, whereas only
five employers punish more often than they reward. One employer
uses each instrument equally often. The results are even stronger
when discretion is high. Here, 15 employers use rewards more
often, while one employer uses punishments more frequently and
two employers use both instruments at the same rate. In both treat-
ments, employers’ preferences for an instrument are remarkably
stable. Only one employer in the low discretion treatment switched
from mainly using rewards in the first half of the experiment to
mainly using punishment in the second half of the experiment.
18 Combined earnings in R&PLow_Discretion are not significantly dif-
ferent from PLow_Discretion (p = 00912), whereas combined earnings
in R&PHigh_Discretion are significantly higher than in PHigh_Discretion
(p= 00000).
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
It is interesting to relate our main findings to the
extant literatures in experimental economics and
management science. Several related literatures have
studied the effectiveness of sanctions and rewards as
incentive schemes (e.g., Andreoni et al. 2003, Brandts
and Charness 2003, Charness et al. 2008, Nikiforakis
and Mitchell 2014), though in different settings and
under different conditions than those studied here.
One related literature focuses on social dilemma set-
tings (e.g., Gürerk et al. 2006, Sefton et al. 2007, Rand
et al. 2009, Sutter et al. 2010, Drouvelis and Jamison
2015). There are several differences between the typ-
ical setup studied in this literature and our inspec-
tion game. A key difference between the settings is
that in the inspection game, players are asymmetric in
terms of their ability to assign or receive punishments
or rewards, whereas in the typical social dilemma
situation players can mutually punish/reward each
other.19 Thus, our setup seems better suited to study
the effectiveness of positive and negative incentives
in hierarchical interactions.
In this sense, our study is also related to the liter-
ature on the use of bonuses and fines in principal-
agent games (e.g., Fehr et al. 2007, Fehr and Schmidt
2007) or on the effect of punishment in gift-exchange
or trust games (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003). How-
ever, the focus of this literature is on the compari-
son between automatic (enforceable) incentives and
discretionary incentives that cannot be enforced by a
third party. In contrast, in this paper we focus on two
different forms of discretionary incentives (rewards
and sanctions) and compare their effectiveness in dis-
ciplining shirking.20
Most closely related is the study by Nosenzo et al.
(2014), who also examine the effectiveness of sanc-
tions and rewards in inspection games.21 They focus
on automatic punishments and rewards that are pure
monetary transfers in one-shot inspection games. As
in the present study, they find that punishments dis-
courage shirking, reduce inspection rates, and lead
19 Exceptions are Gürerk et al. (2009), Heijden van der et al.
(2009), O’Gorman et al. (2009), Carpenter et al. (2012) and Nosenzo
and Sefton (2014) who study settings where the ability to pun-
ish/reward group members is restricted to one player.
20 There are also related studies that compare economically equiv-
alent contracts that are framed either as bonuses or fines (e.g.,
Hannan et al. 2005, Hossain and List 2012, Bigoni et al. 2014,
Armantier and Boly 2015). In contrast to these studies, in our set-
ting, the difference between reward and sanctions is not simply a
matter of framing, and the two instruments provide different incen-
tives to the players.
21 As far as we are aware, there have only been two other experi-
mental studies of inspection games. Glimcher et al. (2005) discuss
inspection games with different parameterizations of the inspection
cost, and Rauhut (2009) studies the impact of the severity of auto-
matic sanctions. Neither study compares sanctions with rewards.
to higher efficiencies, but differently from the present
study, they find that rewards are ineffective in reduc-
ing shirking or raising efficiency.
Thus the disciplining power of punishment is
robust across the two contexts, whereas the effec-
tiveness of rewards seems to be more sensitive to
details of the environment. A theoretical analysis of
how rewards and punishment affect behavior can be
used to reconcile these findings. In Nosenzo et al.
(2014), the fact that punishment is more effective
than reward for discouraging shirking is consistent
with the equilibrium predictions of their one-shot
game. In our setup, the subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the stage game is unaffected by the possi-
bility of using discretionary rewards or punishments
because they are costly and so should not be used
by a profit-maximizing employer. Nevertheless, either
punishments or rewards can discourage shirking in
a repeated game. Thus, as also noted by Rand et al.
(2009) in a public goods context, rewards may be
more effective in repeated game environments. An
interesting avenue for further research would be to
more systematically examine the factors required to
facilitate the effectiveness of positive incentives.
A further difference of our study from Nosenzo
et al. (2014) is that we also study additional treatments
where we allow employers to use both sanctions and
rewards. Somewhat differently from some of the pre-
vious studies that also examined the joint availabil-
ity of sanctions and rewards (e.g., Sefton et al. 2007,
Andreoni et al. 2003), we do not find that combin-
ing the instruments enhances efficiency relative to set-
tings where only rewards are available. This finding
is in line with findings from the principal-agent litera-
ture (Fehr and Schmidt 2007), where contracts combin-
ing bonuses and penalties do not induce significantly
more effort than contracts that only specify bonuses.
Taken together, the findings from our paper and
the related experimental literatures suggest that both
discretionary sanctions and rewards can be effective
in encouraging compliance and influencing behavior
in the direction of more socially efficient outcomes.
The power of sanctions relies on the threat of pun-
ishment rather than on its use, whereas the effec-
tiveness of rewards requires the incentive tool to be
actively used. An implication of this is that the use of
rewards results in a redistribution of wealth between
authorities and subordinates, whereas sanctions can
be used by authorities to reap most of the benefits
generated by the incentive tool.
Our paper also confirms some findings in the
management science literature and adds some novel
insights. In management science, for some decades
there has been a focus on how “transformational”
leadership can improve the performance in firms
(Podsakoff et al. 2010). This literature stresses the
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importance of charismatic and visionary leaders.
Recent research recognizes the importance of “trans-
actional” leadership, according to which managers
can use contingent rewards and punishments to sub-
stantially improve employee attitudes, perceptions,
and job performance (Ball et al. 1994, Podsakoff et al.
2006, Walumbwa et al. 2008).
In agreement with our findings, the management
science literature suggests a positive role for con-
tingent rewards on subsequent job performance,
whereas the role of contingent punishment is more
ambiguous. Several studies report that supervisors
using rewards are more successful in encouraging
subordinates to work hard than supervisors who
use sanctions (e.g., Sims 1980, Podsakoff et al. 1982,
George 1995). In a review, Podsakoff et al. (2006)
report a positive relation between contingent punish-
ment and employee attitudes and perceptions, but
not between this form of leadership behavior and
employee performance. Ball et al. (1994) suggest that
the effectiveness of contingent punishment depends
on the perceived fairness of the punishment and the
type of employee to whom the punishment is meted
out. Employees with a “belief in a just world” respond
in the intended way and improve their behavior if the
punishment is considered appropriate. Some employ-
ees are predisposed to interpreting punishment in
negative terms, though, and for them punishment
may prove counterproductive. Our results agree with
this conclusion; we find that the actual use of punish-
ments hardly reduces shirking and the actual use of
rewards has a dissuasive effect on shirking. We think
it is encouraging that conclusions based on correla-
tional data of the relevant actors in the field are by
and large supported by experimental data that allow
for causal inferences.
Our paper also adds new insight to the manage-
ment science literature. We find that the effectiveness
of sanctions appears to be less sensitive to the details
of the social and economic environment, whereas
rewards can be more effective in some environments
than others. In particular, rewards become a very
attractive tool if the manager has a lot of discretionary
power and can choose to reward without inspecting
a worker. This implies that the relative effectiveness
of rewards and punishments depends on the extent
to which the managers have to justify their behavior.
The management science literature suggests some
promising avenues for further experimental research.
In particular, in our paper, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to judge whether a reward or punishment is fair
because an employee only chooses between working
and shirking. In practice, it will often be much harder
to judge employee behavior, and therefore there will
be more room for self-serving distortions of what
constitutes a fair reward or punishment. It will be
interesting to study the extent to which the current
findings will generalize when more uncertainty about
worker performance is introduced. In addition, on the
basis of a questionnaire in the laboratory and a sur-
vey in the field, O’Reillys and Puffer (1989) point to
the social role that contingent punishments may play
in organizations. Their results suggest that contingent
punishments positively affect the motivation and sat-
isfaction of team members who observe the punish-
ment being administered to the misbehaving worker.
It would be interesting to study if such equity feelings
translate to an improvement in the behavior of the
observing team members. They may perform better if
they feel that misbehaving workers are punished.
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material to this paper is available at http://dx
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